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Abstract
This paper studies the role of income distribution as a determinant of the size of the informal
sector in an economy by relying on a channel whereby inequality aﬀects the behaviour of
aggregate demand and thus inﬂuences the incentives a ﬁrm has to become informal. It is
further postulated that income distribution aﬀects the response of the informal sector to
diﬀerent ﬁscal policies, either demand or supply-orientated. The main ﬁndings are that high
inequality leads to a large informal sector, and that redistribution towards the middle class
decreases the size of the informal sector and increases the capacity of ﬁscal instruments to
reduce informality. Empirical evidence for Mexican cities is provided.
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11 Introduction
The literature on the driving forces underlying the informal economy has mainly focused
on the eﬀects of government actions, notably taxation and regulation1, and has reached
the widespread conclusion that the existence of an informal sector is due to the failure of
political institutions in promoting a working market economy2. Consistently with this view
Johnson et al. (1998) and Friedman et al. (2000) ﬁnd that institutional traits (such as the
extent of corruption or the strength of the rule of law) explain most of the cross-country
variation of the available informality measures3.
It is also well-established that when studying informality, ﬁrm size does matter. Large,
capital-intensive ﬁrms are prone to operate in the formal sector, reaping the fruits of
eﬃciency from legality and economies of scale, while small ﬁrms usually operate informally.
They sacriﬁce eﬃciency but avoid taxation. In words of De Soto (1989, p. 153),
“[T]he need to avoid detection forces informals to operate on a very small
scale. They deliberately limit their operations or, if they need to grow, do
so by dispersing their workers so that there are never more than ten in one
establishment. [S]uch arrangements [...] prevent them from achieving eﬃcient
scales of production.”
On the other hand, Levenson and Maloney (1998) provide a fresh, alternative interpretation
to the emergence of an informal sector particularly to the size choice of informals, without
relying on the burden imposed by the government. They state that small ﬁrms do not
scale down to avoid paying taxes, but their limited investment needs and the narrow
nature of their operations make stable property rights unimportant and the gains from civic
participation ﬂimsy. Naturally, since the beneﬁts from participating in societal institutions
grow larger as ﬁrms do, voluntary compliance and the will to being charged (i.e., taxed)
for participation arise4. In other words, ﬁrms evolve from informality to formality as they
grow to their long-run equilibrium size.
Reasoning along these lines, the structure of the market is likely to be a determinant
of the size of the informal sector as important as the governmental burden imposed on
1 See De Soto (1989) and Rauch (1991). See also Schneider and Enste (2000) for a review.
2 Loayza (1996) provides a balance of costs and beneﬁts of (in)formality. See also Schneider (2005).
3 A striking ﬁnding of Friedman et al. (2000) is that higher tax rates are associated with a small informal
sector. They argue that high tax rates increase tax revenues that would enable the government to ﬁnance
a stronger legal environment and, consequentially, to reduce informality.
4 An interesting conclusion from this analysis is that since it is not cost-eﬀective for the government
to monitor the smallest and typically least productive ﬁrms, the large informal sectors observed in
developing countries may be optimal. See Asea (1996).
2business-making5. In fact, a ﬁrm deciding the sector in which to operate would compare the
beneﬁts from producing with scale economies and paying taxes against those from producing
under a less eﬃcient technology. If a demand expansion occurs, ceteris paribus, the beneﬁts
of formality become evident as it eases meeting the higher demand and generating the
corresponding proﬁts, leading to a further reduction in the costs of formality.
In this paper I argue that income distribution plays a role in the determination of the size of
the informal sector as it shapes the way the market, particularly aggregate demand, behaves6
and thus inﬂuences the environment in which a ﬁrm decides its size and its formality status.
As a by-product of the analysis, I postulate that income distribution aﬀects the response
of the informal sector to ﬁscal policies, either demand or supply-orientated. The literature
is basically silent on these matters whose importance lies in the fact that they may add a
new perspective in evaluating the eﬀects of redistributive policies especially in developing
countries. Indeed, there are just a few previous works exploring the relationship between
income distribution and the extent of informality, all of them based on diﬀerent theoretical
motivations from the one stressed here.
In a model with rural-urban migration, Rauch (1993) ﬁnds that the size of the informal
sector follows an inverted-U pattern with the level of urbanisation, linking informality with
the well-known Kuznets’s hypothesis. During the middle stage of development, inequality
increases as rural poor move to the city to participate in the informal sector. On the other
hand, Schneider and Enste (2000, ch. 7) argue that a large social welfare system aimed to
ﬂatten the income distribution should increase the size of the informal economy because of
strong disincentives to work in the formal economy.
Rosser et al. (2000, 2003) report a positive correlation between the Gini coeﬃcient and the
size of the informal sector among transition economies. They argue that the detrimental
eﬀect of informality on public ﬁnances reduces the capacity a government has to perform
sound redistributive policies, whereas inequality encourages the desire a person may have
to disregard the prevailing regulations. Finally, Chong and Gradstein (2004) perform an
exhaustive empirical cross-country analysis and ﬁnd that higher inequality in conjunction
with weak institutions increases the degree of informality. They suggest that when resources
are up for grabs in the formal sector, poor individuals may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to enter the
informal sector where they can retain their output fully. High inequality, exacerbated by
low institutional quality, magniﬁes this eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents a stylised model in which
5 According to recent ﬁndings in Antunes and Cavalcanti (2004), regulations costs are important in
explaining the size of the informal sector in industralised economies, whereas market imperfections are
far more relevant in developing countries.
6 Benassi et al. (2002) ﬁnd that an increase in the income concentration towards the middle class expands
demand and increases its price elasticity. This idea goes back to Robinson (1969, pp. 70–71).
3income distribution ultimately aﬀects the decision of ﬁrms to become (in)formal. Section
3 studies the equilibrium properties of the model and derive empirical hypotheses to be
tested in section 4, with data from Mexican cities. Section 5 concludes and suggests some
avenues for future research.
2 A simple model
Income distribution determines demand7 and ﬁrms decide whether to operate in the formal
or the informal economy. The government collects taxes and returns them to society either
as a productive public good for its use by formal ﬁrms or as transfers to the poor. For
expositional convenience, the institutional quality of the model economy is given and it
is assumed that ﬁrms in both sectors exercise full property rights over their production.
Moreover, I refrain from modeling distracting issues for the purposes of this study such as
corruption, limited enforceability and credit market imperfections.
2.1 Production
There is a continuum of productive sectors. Each one consists of just one competitive ﬁrm
which produces a homogenous good using labour (also homogenous) as the unique input.
The input requirement for any sector z ∈ [0,∞) to produce a unit of output is α > 1 and
labour is paid a wage w.
2.1.1 Types and prices
In each sector, the ﬁrm can be either informal or formal. An informal ﬁrm has proﬁts
πI
z = (pz − αw)Qz where pz and Qz are the price and quantity produced of good z.
Competition implies that in equilibrium pz = p = αw and πI
z = 0.
Alternatively, a ﬁrm can belong to the formal sector. If so, it pays a ﬁxed entry fee (i.e. a
tax) τ to the government and receives a beneﬁt in exchange: its unit labour requirement
reduces to α(1 − ρ) < α, where ρ ∈ (0,1) is a productivity-enhancing factor that arises
from the access to productive public services8. Hence, the proﬁts of a formal ﬁrm are
πF
z = (pz − α(1 − ρ)w)Qz − τ9.
7 The demand side of the model is based on Dasgupta and Ray (1986), Murphy et al. (1989) and
Matsuyama (2000), which analyse diﬀerent consequences of inequality.
8 See Johnson et al. (1997) and Friedman et al. (2000) for alternative public ﬁnance mechanisms that
relate tax revenue to the provision of public goods.
9 It is important to note that the public service is non-rival and non-excludable and hence is not subject
to congestion. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) conclude that in this case lump-sum taxes are superior
than distortionary taxation for the productive eﬃciency of public services.
4Since goods are homogenous, a formal ﬁrm may compete with informals. Charging a price
higher than p implies zero sales for the former while charging a lower price rules out
informal ﬁrms. To maximise proﬁts, the price charged should be inﬁnitesimally below p, so
in equilibrium a formal ﬁrm charges what it would be charged by an informal pz = p = αw.
Thus, p = αw for every sector, regardless of the size of the informal sector10.
2.1.2 Choosing (in)formality
Consider a sector q where the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between being formal or informal, i.e.
πF
q = πI





For given τ, ρ and w, the ﬁrm’s decision to be in the formal sector depends on the demand
it faces. From (1) it can be seen that if ﬁrms with demand Qz < Nq will be informal
(πF
z < 0 = πI
z) whereas ﬁrms with Qz > Nq beneﬁt from formality since πF
z > 0 = πI
z. Thus,
Nq is the break-even demand level of a formal ﬁrm or the minimum demand requirement to
make formality worthy. Clearly, a rise in Nq would hinder ﬁrms to enter the formal sector.
2.2 Households
There is a continuum of length one of households, each inhabited by one individual, which
are identical in all aspects except in their income from rents. As ownership of the productive
ﬁrms is assumed to be random, so is income.
2.2.1 Preferences and choices
A typical household consumes only a unit of each good z and has a utility U =
R ∞
0 βzxz dz
where xz = 1 if good z is consumed and xz = 0 if not. I assume that βz is decreasing in z.
This implies that the individual consumes good z as long as she has consumed all the other
goods with indices less than z. Accordingly, goods are ordered in terms of priority11.
If the individual’s income is y, then its budget constraint is
R ∞
0 pzxz dz ≤ y and the solution
of the utility maximisation problem is straightforward: she chooses xz = 1 for z ∈ [0,z∗]
10 If informal ﬁrms are interpreted as incumbents and a formal ﬁrm as an entrant, we could rely on Murphy
et al. (1989) to show that charging p = αw is a Nash equilibrium in such an entry game.
11 An alternative setup that also leads to a well-deﬁned preference ordering over goods is to set βz = β
and let the input requirement vary across sectors. The priorities will be given by the ranking among the
prices of the goods. See Matsuyama (2000) for further details.




pz dz = αwz
∗ (2)
Note that since there is a direct mapping from U to z∗, the numbers of goods consumed
z∗ and income y are themselves indirect utility measures. Thus, an increase in utility is
achieved only by augmenting the number (variety) of goods the household purchases.
Preferences are non-homothetic (income changes the marginal utility over goods) and lead to
(Hicks-Allen) demand complementarity from lower-indexed goods to higher-indexed goods,
but not the other way around. Thus, an increase in income or a reduction in p increases the
demand for higher-indexed goods without aﬀecting the demand for lower-indexed goods.
2.2.2 Income distribution and poverty
Income is composite by wages and rents. Every household supplies inelastically a unit of
labour and earns a wage w. It also owns a share θ ∈ [0;[θp,∞)) of all the proﬁts in the
economy π (deﬁned below), so its income is y = w + θπ.
Shares are given randomly. Let R(θ) be the number of people whose share is less than or
equal to θ. The number of shareholders is Np = 1 − R(θp), so there are R(θp) people with
income y = w who cannot purchase any good traded in the market since p = αw > w. I
will refer to the subset R(θp) as the “poor.”
2.2.3 Aggregate demand
Given the non-homotheticity of preferences, income distribution determines aggregate
demand12. Individuals with income greater than yz = w + θzπ purchase a unit of good
z. Since each individual buys only one unit of each good she can aﬀord, the aggregate
demand of good z is
Nz = 1 − R(θz) (3)
Goods at the lower end of the spectrum are consumed by almost all households. As their
income levels go up, households expand their consumption basket by adding higher-indexed
goods. Hence, rich households consume the same goods as the poor plus some more, implying
that Nz is decreasing in z. Therefore, following the ﬁrms’ decision surrounding equation (1),
ﬁrms in sectors z ∈ [0,q] will be formal whereas ﬁrms in z ∈ (q,∞) prefer informality.
12 With homothetic preferences only mean income matters in the determination of demand. The results of
the model depend crucially on this non-homotheticity assumption. If preferences were homothetic and
no further restriction were imposed on household income (for instance, a liquidity constraint), then the
multiplier eﬀect explained below would not arise.
62.3 Fiscal balance
For the moment, the role of the government in the model is to collect taxes and return them
to society in the form of the productivity factor ρ. An alternative use of ﬁscal resources in
the form of a transfers program is analysed in section 3.3.
Let g be the ﬁscal expenditure designated to the provision of the public service. As tax




τ dz = τq (4)
The public service is produced with the following technology:




ρ < 1 (5)
The elasticity of ρ with respect to the public expenditure εg = (dρ/dg)(g/ρ) ≥ 0 is assumed
to be small13.
2.4 Equilibrium
The expenditure of a household that consumes goods in the interval [0,q] is pq = αwq
whereas the income that allows it to purchase these goods is yq = w + θqπ,
αwq = w + θqπ (6)
Now, equilibrium can be found upon aggregation of individual expenditures.
2.4.1 Formal sector
Consumers with θ ∈ [θp,θq] spend all their income in goods sold in the formal sector, while
consumers with θ ∈ (θq,∞) only spend the share θq of their rents in such goods. Hence, the






min{w + θπ,w + θqπ}dR(θ) = wN
p + π (Θq + θqNq) (7)
where QF is the aggregate production in the formal sector and Θq ≡
R θq
θp θdR(θ) is the
share of proﬁts in the hands of “middle class.”
13 The appendix, equation (A15), shows what is meant by “small εg” in terms of the various parameters
of the model.






(w + θπ)dR(θ) = wNp + πΘ (8)
where Θ ≡
R ∞
θp θdR(θ) and QI is the supply of goods from the informal sector. Total
sales are determined by the income of all shareholders whereas the sales of the formal
sector depend on the income of the middle class and a fraction of the income of the “upper
class” (the subset with θ > θq). This follows from the demand structure of the model: as
the lower-indexed goods are at the top of the preference ranking, aggregate demand will
be high and hence the beneﬁts from formality are sizeable in those sectors. A wealthier
individual can aﬀord buying higher-indexed goods so that she contributes with the sales of
low demand ﬁrms14.






ρw(Np − Nq) (9)
Remarkably, the sales to the upper class allow formal ﬁrms to face the entry costs τ15. The
remaining sales, those aimed to the middle class, give formal ﬁrms proﬁts that are eventually
redistributed among households. When an individual enters the middle class and purchases
a good in the formal sector, proﬁts increase by ρw(Np − Nq) where ρ is the proﬁt rate of
formal ﬁrms. Then, a fraction of Θq of the generated proﬁts is redistributed to the middle
class and comes back as demand for further formal goods, leading to an extra increase
in proﬁts of ρΘq. As this process continues indeterminately, a multiplier eﬀect arises with
(1 − ρΘq)−1 > 1 being the multiplier.
2.4.2 Labour market
The labour market equilibrium condition is LF +LI = 1 or α(1−ρ)QF +αQI = 1. Provided
that labour supply is ﬁxed, that each household supplies inelastically a unit of labour and
that the same labour input is demanded by the formal and informal sectors, there exists a
positive wage rate that clears the labour market. From now on, the wage is treated as the
numeraire, w = 1.
14 It may seem counterintuitive that the upper class purchases informal goods whereas the poor and the
middle class purchase only formal goods. This is due to prices (and qualities) among all traded goods
being equal, so demand is determined by the number of customers. If prices were allowed to change, as
suggested in footnote 11, then demand would be determined by the expenditure of the customers, which
would create a positive correlation between the costumers’ wealth and sales, leading to informal goods
being purchased by the poorest individuals. Allowing for diﬀerent prices or qualities would only increase
the mathematical diﬃculty of the model, without changing the main insights of the analysis.
15 This is captured in the last term of equation (7), θqπNq. It is easy to show that ρθqπNq = τq.
8It is worth noting that as LI = αQI, an increase in LI is associated with a proportional
increase in the sales of the informal sector and vice versa. This tight relationship does not
hold necessarily in the formal sector, LF = α(1 − ρ)QF, where an increase in LF may
be associated with a higher input requirement, i.e. a smaller ρ, even when sales are kept
unchanged. Moreover, as the labour supply is constant, a change in LF is compensated
with a similar change (with the opposite sign) in LI. Consequently, if the goods market
in the formal sector is in equilibrium, so are the labour market (in both sectors) and the
goods market in the informal sector. Thus, equations (1) and (9) alone deﬁne the goods
and labour market equilibria.
2.4.3 General equilibrium
Apart from the markets described thus far, there is a third market that has not been
modelled explicitly, which entails the transactions carried “outside the market” by the R(θp)
people deﬁned as poor, with an aggregate income of wR(θp) = R(θp). This market has many
interpretations, for example that of a subsistence good that is a substitute of the good traded
in the model economy (though the latter is strictly preferred). By Walras’s law, equilibrium
is reached if both (1) and (9) are solved. Notice that we are implicitly assuming that the
proﬁts in this market are zero and, hence, do not contribute with aggregate wealth16.
2.5 Mechanisms
Given R(θ), two opposite forces lead to equilibrium following the setting of the tax rate τ.
At the ﬁrm level, a tax increase has a negative eﬀect on the proﬁts on the marginal ﬁrm q
as the savings from contracting less labour are more than oﬀset by the higher tax burden17.
This increases informality and drops tax revenues and proﬁts. At the aggregate level, on the
contrary, for a given tax base q, a tax increase raises the multiplier and in turn aggregate
proﬁts. It follows a rise in income, demand, formality and tax revenues. The same reasoning
applies for a tax reduction.
Both of these eﬀects interact and lead to multiple equilibria, as in Johnson et al. (1997), i.e,
the coexistence of “bad” high informality - low tax revenues - low demand equilibria with
“good” low informality - high tax revenues - high demand equilibria. Which equilibrium
the economy ends in will depend on initial conditions and, crucially, on income distribution
(i.e. the degree of inequality)18.
16 Furthermore any feedback from this market to the economy modelled, for instance in productivity is
ruled out. A richer framework where such a feedback is present is Dasgupta and Ray (1986).
17 This follows directly from the deﬁnition of Nq in (1).
18 These facts suggest that the “optimal” level of τ (and hence ρ) is an interior solution, as in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Loayza (1996).
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(Np − Nq) (F-curve)
and constitute the toolbox for the comparative statics analysis of this section19.
The points on the M-curve balance the incentives an individual ﬁrm has to become
(in)formal for a given governmental burden. They are tightly related with the traditional
theories of the informal sector such as the celebrated work of De Soto (1989). On the
other hand, the F-curve relates proﬁt generation with the presence of informal ﬁrms. This
curve itself and its movements summarise the inﬂuence of market froces on informality.
Interestingly, equilibrium is reached when both curves intersect, which suggests than none
of the views of informality can fully explain the phenomenon alone. This fact may be
regarded as the main contribution of this study.
On the M-curve, for given τ an increase in Nq should be accompanied by a proportional
reduction in ρ so ρNq remains unchanged. The decrease in ρ comes from a fall in the number
of formal sectors q, implying a reduction in proﬁts and a downward-sloped M-curve. The
F-curve has also a negative slope since a higher value of Nq, ceteris paribus, expels some
ﬁrms from the formal sector and reduces aggregate proﬁts. Alternatively, a reduction of π
decreases aggregate income, contracting the demand of all ﬁrms and making Nq relatively
higher. As the elasticity εg is assumed to be low, the M-curve is steeper than the F-curve.
3.1 Redistribution
To analyse the consequences of a redistribution of ownership on the informal sector, consider
a mean-preserving spread of R(θ) as shown in Figure 1(a), where the bold line represents
some share distribution and the light line is its mean-preserving spread, R∗(θ). A shift from
R(θ) to R∗(θ) is achieved by redistributing the shares from the upper class towards the
middle class without modifying either the mean in θ ∈ [θp,∞), Θ, or the number of poor,
R(θp). The eﬀect of the poor entering the market is studied later.
Two possible cases arise depending on the initial θq and, in turn, the initial degree of




θq θdR(θ), so if high values of θ > θq are found
19 See the appendix for the diﬀerential version of the model in which this section is based. The exposition
on the following exercises may be interpreted as a dynamic response to shocks. Yet it is also useful to take
them as cross-sectional comparisons of economies which is incidentally the usual approach in empirical
analysis of the informal sector.
10Figure 1. Mean-preserving spread of R(θ)
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with positive probability, the more unequal the society and the higher the odds of having
θq < Θ. In the opposite case, the values of θ are more concentrated around θq. As a result,
the shareholders are more homogenous and θq > Θ is a more likely outcome.
If θq < Θ, the initial situation implies high inequality within the upper class and between
it and the middle class. As shown in Figure 1(a) after redistribution, R∗(θq) > R(θq) (i.e.
1 − N∗
q > 1 − Nq) so the ﬁxed break-even demand of the marginal ﬁrm falls (N∗
q < Nq),
increasing the number of ﬁrms operating formally. Redistribution raises the share of proﬁts
held by the middle class, Θ∗
q > Θq, and in doing so raises the proﬁt multiplier in (9).
Notably, initial high inequality implies that after redistribution, a sizeable upper class still
exists, so the entry costs of formal ﬁrms are still covered while sales from informal ﬁrms
decrease. As Figure 1(b) shows, the F-curve shifts up from FA to FB. Given the higher
proﬁts and lower Nq in the new equilibrium, the size of the informal economy declines20.
On the other hand, redistribution under θq > Θ renders the opposite outcome: it raises Nq
and lowers Θq, so the F-curve falls from FB to FA in Figure 1(b). Initially, the upper class
was close to the middle class, so a drop in the former makes ﬁrms use part of their revenues
from the middle class to cover their costs after redistribution. As a result, proﬁts decrease,
leading to a larger informal sector.
3.2 Providing the public good
Consider an increase in the tax rate, dτ > 0. This shock, depending on its eﬀects on the
tax base q, can either increase or decrease tax revenues and ﬁscal expenditure (g = τq).
The latter response is crucial for the analysis as it deﬁnes the direction in which ρ moves
20 The M-curve may shift to the left as a result of a higher ρ due to the eﬀects of a larger formal sector on
tax revenues. The direction of this change reinforces the expansion of the F-curve.
11Figure 2. Tax increase to ﬁnance the public service






M  0 M  1 π
Nq






M  0 M  1 π
Nq
(a)  dτ > 0, dg < 0
 
→    →
↓
↓
and, subsequently, the movements of the M- and F-curves.
Suppose ﬁrst that dτ > 0 and dg < 0, which implies that (dτ/τ) < −(dq/q) and,
importantly, that dρ < 0. This situation is shown in Figure 2(a). The M-curve shifts to
the right (from M0 to M1) as a consequence of the higher entry costs that are reinforced by
a decline in the beneﬁts of formality, ρ. As the reduction in ρ shrinks the proﬁt multiplier
in (9), the F-curve contracts from F0 to F1. The new equilibrium, with higher Nq and
lower π, is characterised by a smaller number of formal sectors (dq < 0) and lower sales
both in the formal sector (dSF < 0) and in the whole economy (dS < 0). The eﬀect
on the relative size of the informal sector is, however, ambiguous. The labour demand of
formal ﬁrms decreases in response to lower sales but increases as the unit labour requirement
α(1−ρ) becomes higher. If the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, then the informal share of the economy
increases (dLI = dSI > 0).
For this case to be feasible, q must be very responsive to the tax change. This is likely to
happen when Nq is initially small, which implies a high value for θq. As seen in the previous
subsection, this setup is consistent with a large middle class in conjunction with a reduced
upper class, i.e. low initial inequality. Under these circumstances a drop in sales following
the reduction in the income (as dπ < 0) is likely to dominate the higher labour demand in
the formal sector, leading to a contraction of the F-curve and a larger informal sector21.
Consider now that dτ > 0 and dg > 0, which implies that (dτ/τ) > −(dq/q) and dρ > 0.
As shown in Figure 2(b), the M-curve shifts to the right (from M0 to M1) again22 but the
F-curve expands, delivering three possible outcomes. If the shift is from F0 to F1, in the
21 This is the static comparative result of models with no distributional features (i.e. zero inequality) as
Rauch (1991) and Johnson et al. (1997).
22 Note that the percentage increase in τ is greater than that of ρ. The M-curve shifts to the right as long
as (dτ/τ) > −εg(1 − εg)(dq/q), which is satisﬁed if (dτ/τ) > −(dq/q) holds.
12new equilibrium the drop in proﬁts translates into a smaller number of formal industries,
lower overall sales, and lower formal sector sales (dq, dS and dSF are all negative). The
drop in SF together with the higher beneﬁt from being formal (lower input requirement,
α(1 − ρ) since dρ > 0) leads unambiguously to a lower labour demand from formal ﬁrms
and a larger operating informal sector23.
The equilibrium resulting from the shift from F0 to F2 (where dπ = 0) is qualitatively
similar to the one just described, with the important diﬀerence that dS = 0, so that the
change in the size of the informal sector is, albeit positive, smaller. Notice that, ceteris
paribus, the value of Θq implied in the curve F2 is higher than the one in F1. Hence, a larger
middle class or lower inequality, by increasing the multiplier, makes the (expansionary)
eﬀects of a larger provision of public good (more ﬁscal resources) more powerful.
This fact opens the possibility of ending up in the intersection of M1 with an F-curve
above F2 (for instance, F3). This equilibrium has diﬀerent properties from the previous as
the tax increase raises both Nq and π, and notably may have a smaller informal sector as
an outcome. For a given Θq, consistent mainly with (dτ/τ) > −(dq/q), this case may arise
if ρ is large enough, i.e. if the public good or service is fairly productive24.
3.3 Transfers
An exogenous increase in the number of shareholders Np expands the F-curve without
perturbing the M-curve. The outcome is a lower level Nq, higher proﬁts and a smaller
informal sector. The reason is that as the number of market participants rises, the demand
of lower-indexed goods expands thus rendering higher proﬁts to these sectors. The multiplier
eﬀect does the rest of the work. With this in mind, I now analyse the workings of a
redistributive use of tax revenues: a transfers program. This links the number of participants
to tax revenues in order to study demand eﬀects from ﬁscal revenues, as opposed to the
supply eﬀects considered so far. In this subsection I assume that the government allocates a
ﬁxed amount g for the provision of the public good, so ρ becomes constant (or set εg = 0).
As discussed before, R(θp) people have income lower than the price of the traded good.
The transfers program bridges the income gap w(α − 1) for n people as far as the amount
of tax collection allows. The government’s new budget constraint, in place of (4), is
g + (α − 1)n = τq (10)
23 Interestingly, the same result arises in Loayza (1996), where the public good is subject to congestion and
there is free-riding from the informal ﬁrms in its use.
24 The positive relationship between τ and the size of the informal sector is in line with the empirical ﬁnding
in Friedman et al. (2000) discussed in footnote 3. It may prove useful to see whether the particular sample
used in their analysis is driving this result, particularly the inclusion of Scandinavian countries or others
where the government share in spending is considerably large.
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and the number of participants equals the number of shareholders plus the transfers
receivers, Np = 1 − R(θp) + n25.
In this new setup, the M-curve becomes vertical so the tax rate τ alone determines the
equilibrium level of Nq. The F-curve remains negatively-sloped. Figure 3 displays the eﬀects
on a tax increase used to ﬁnance the transfers program. The characteristics of the equilibria
given by the intersection of M1 and F1 or F2 are similar to the analysis of Figure 2(b): the
informal sector enlarges following the shock.
The rationale of the transfers program is to increase the demand of lower-indexed goods.
Hence, a suﬃciently large expansion of the F-curve to reach F3 requires the introduction of
a large number of people to the market, which is a likely situation if the initial poor rate is
moderately high. This implies that the program induces a signiﬁcant increase in the size of
the middle class. It is possible, once again, to observe a reduction in the informal economy
as a consequence of a higher tax rate as it increases tax revenues.
3.4 Empirical hypotheses
The model provides two empirically testable predictions regarding the eﬀects of income
distribution on the size of the informal sector in an economy. Firstly, income distribution
aﬀects informality directly, as it allocates resources between those who purchase only formal
goods and those who also consume informal goods. Speciﬁcally, high inequality leads to
a large informal sector. By the same token, if inequality is high or, alternatively, the
amount of wealth concentrated in the upper class is disproportionately large, redistribution
towards the middle class reduces informality. On the contrary, if inequality is relatively low,
redistribution may weaken the upper class and reduce the base spending that pushes ﬁrms
25 Notice that the higher purchasing power of these n households does not aﬀect the multiplier as Θq
remains unchanged.
14to formality.
Secondly, income distribution aﬀects the way informality responds to ﬁscal changes that
aﬀect either the demand or the supply side of the economy. In particular, the more unequal a
society, the less powerful the ﬁscal policy. As the middle class expands, the marginal eﬀects
of a further ﬁscal intervention against informality are reinforced. This analysis suggests
therefore that redistributive policies promoted by the government may trigger a virtue
circle in reducing the size of the informal sector.
I now ascertain whether the data support these hypotheses.
4 Empirical evidence from urban Mexico
As mentioned earlier, Chong and Gradstein (2004) provide empirical support to the fact
that inequality measures, such as Gini or Theil coeﬃcients, aﬀect positively the size of the
informal sector within countries. In this section I perform a parallel analysis using data
from Mexican cities during the 1990s and the early 2000s.
4.1 A glimpse of Mexico
The Mexican case nicely suits the purpose of testing the predictions of the model for various
reasons. In Mexico income distribution is mostly unequal, with a Gini coeﬃcient around
0.5, and the informal sector represents about 30 percent of GDP. Nonetheless, as with
among diﬀerent countries, cross-sectional variation across Mexican states and cities can be
considerable. As stressed in Chiquiar (2005), the development experience of the 32 Mexican
states has been dissimilar, with the historically wealthier northern states enjoying higher
growth rates of per capita income than the relatively poorer southern states26.
Time variation can also be found as some important macroeconomic events in the 90s had
diﬀerent eﬀects on income dynamics in the diﬀerent regions. Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas
(2000) show that the ﬁnancial crisis after the peso devaluation in December 1994 reduced
income inequality by depressing the labour earnings of the highly-skilled workers (the Gini
coeﬃcient fell from 0.534 in 1994 to 0.519 in 1996); once the economy recovered from the
crisis, inequality increased. A second major event was the enactment of the NAFTA also
in 1994. Cortez (2001) and Chiquiar (2005) suggest that the trade agreement led to a
rapid growth in export-orientated manufactures, widening the wage gap between skilled
and unskilled work. Consequently, the states with high industrial participation in local
26 As a matter of fact, the latter are ethnolinguistically more heterogenous than the northern states, with
a signiﬁcant share of indigenous population. La Porta et al. (1999) ﬁnd that, among countries, this
fractionalisation aﬀects the performance of government and productivity.
15GDP underwent an increasing wage inequality as opposed to those producing mainly non-
tradables as services.
Another reason that makes the Mexican case appealing is that even though the degree of
law enforcement and some legal practices may vary across states, personal and corporate
income taxes and social security contributions faced by the private sector are roughly the
same across them27. This is an important advantage over cross-country studies where there is
a stronger need to control for these factors, most of the time with very imperfect measures
(i.e. indices) of ﬁscal burden or regulation depth. For a state or city, those factors can
be regarded as ﬁxed, whereas major tax reforms or changes in the rules of the game (for
instance, as a result of the 1994 events) can be largely treated as time eﬀects. These facts are
very useful for identiﬁcation since the M-curve can be regarded as ﬁxed and the econometric
estimates would come from variation due to movements of the F-curve.
A crucial point to correctly interpret the empirical results below is to understand the way
the various levels of government relate in ﬁscal matters. Tax collection and administration
are centralised by the Federal government and the ﬁnancial dependence of states accounts
on federal transfers (Fondos de Aportaciones) is considerably high. By the late 90s for
instance, more than 80% of the states’ expenditures was ﬁnanced by federal resources and
just about 6% by their own tax revenues. Clearly, ﬂuctuations in the ﬁscal accounts at the
state level are mainly due to changes in the federal budget, i.e. aggregate shocks. Thus, the
correlation between ﬁscal revenues and expenditures at the state level is empirically not as
high as postulated in section 3. So, from now on I consider changes in the ﬁscal stance not
as changes in τ but in g directly.
4.2 Data
An unbalanced panel using city and state variables was built for the years 1992, 1994, 1996,
1998, 2000 and 2002. When data are only available at the state level, the same ﬁgure is
assigned to cities within the same state. The main source of information is the Mexican
National Statistical Oﬃce, INEGI, with the exception of data on inﬂation which come from
the Bank of Mexico28 and information on ﬁscal accounts that comes from the Centre for
Public Finance Studies of the Chamber of Deputies29.
Employment-related variables come from the National Survey of Urban Employment,
27 Of course, there are some state level taxes but factor mobility and its limited share in the state revenues
(see next paragraph) make them unimportant for the analysis. There are also diﬀerentiated taxes aimed
to encourage sectoral or regional investment or trade. For instance, the VAT rate is 15% in all Mexico
except in border areas where it is 10%. In the empirical work the accounting for the sectoral structure
or the geographical location of states controls for these sources of heterogeneity in the tax system.
28 See http://www.banxico.org.mx/siteBanxicoINGLES/index.html.
29 See http://www.cefp.org.mx.
16ENEU, which is the basis for calculating oﬃcial labour statistics. In 1992, the ENEU
provided data from 32 major metropolitan areas; by 2002 it covered 48 cities30. Income
distribution and inequality measures come from the National Survey of Household Income
and Expenditure, ENIGH, which provides more detailed and complete information on
income than the ENEU, which only supplies information on reported wages31.
Two diﬀerent operational criteria for identifying people working in the informal sector are
common in applied work32. The ﬁrst, pioneered by the International Labour Organization
(labelled Size), counts as informal those who are employed in ﬁrms with ﬁve or fewer
employees. Clearly, this count would overstate the actual size of the informal sector. The
fact that a small ﬁrm tend to be informal does not mean that every small ﬁrm is informal,
whereas the self-employed can easily comply with the prevailing taxation and regulation.
The second criterion counts as formal those who receive social security coverage or pay
social security taxes as a condition of employment. Then, informality is approximated by
the proportion of occupied people who do not receive any social beneﬁt but do earn a wage
(labelled Social Security). Note that this follows the usual practice of excluding domestic
servants and people with other types of jobs that may be rewarded partially in kind. For
this reason, this measure may understate the size of the informal sector.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of the above measures of informality. Unsurprisingly,
the ﬁgures of the Social Security criterion are smaller than those corresponding to the
Size criterion. The former are closer to independent estimates of the size of the informal
sector, around 30 percent33. At the aggregate level, both measures display similar dynamics,
peaking by the mid-’90s and falling towards the early-2000s. This pattern is viewed only
among the poorest states when using the Size criterion. This casual inspection of the data
suggests that the Size criterion may not only overstate the size of the informal sector but
may also capture the dynamics of other labour market issues rather than working in the
informal sector. For robustness’ sake, I consider both measures in the regressions below,
but the Social Security criterion, the preferred measure, will receive most of the attention.
The table also reports the Gini coeﬃcients and the share of total income in the hands of the
third and fourth quintiles (of the income distribution) as an approximation of the size of the
30 The sample is selected to be geographically and socioeconomically representative. Further details on the
evolution of the ENEU can be found at http://www.inegi.gob.mx.
31 A word of caution: only the 1998 wave of the ENIGH is representative at the state level (all waves
are representative at the national, urban and rural levels). The remaining waves are representative for
a varying subset of the 32 states. Therefore, I do not use the expansion factors when computing the
inequality measures (results with weighted ﬁgures are similar, though). By the same token, the statistics
based on ENIGH should be viewed as indicative.
32 See for instance Marcouiller et al. (1997) and Schneider and Enste (2002, ch. 5).
33 See Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002) and Schneider (2005).
17Table 1. Informality and income distribution in Mexican states
Informality, Social security Informality, Size
1992/94 1996/98 2000/02 1992/94 1996/98 2000/02
Poorest 5 29.7 (6.3) 34.4 (7.3) 31.5 (6.2) 48.8 (5.9) 51.2 (5.7) 49.9 (6.5)
Richest 5 19.7 (5.9) 21.4 (5.8) 20.0 (5.8) 38.9 (5.2) 36.6 (6.0) 35.3 (6.1)
All 23.3 (6.7) 27.6 (7.5) 24.0 (7.0) 43.7 (6.1) 44.2 (7.1) 42.0 (7.6)
Income dist., 100·Gini coeﬃcient Income dist., Quintiles 3 and 4
1992/94 1996/98 2000/02 1992/94 1996/98 2000/02
Poorest 5 53.6 (5.9) 51.8 (4.4) 55.9 (6.1) 31.4 (2.3) 33.3 (2.4) 32.5 (4.3)
Richest 5 48.8 (3.3) 49.7 (5.2) 49.4 (4.5) 33.2 (2.8) 32.6 (3.8) 32.9 (2.2)
All 49.6 (5.6) 51.6 (6.6) 50.1 (6.0) 33.1 (3.1) 31.8 (4.2) 33.2 (3.6)
The table displays sample averages and standard deviations in parentheses. The states were ranked
according to their GDP per capita in 1992. The measures of the informal sector come from ENEU; measures
of the income distribution come from ENIGH (ﬁgures from ENIGH are not weighted, see footnote 31).
middle class in each state34. Most of the changes have been observed in the poorest states,
precisely those with higher and more volatile measures of informality. At a ﬁrst glance,
the cross-sectional diﬀerences appear to be supportive of the predictions of the model. The
conclusion is not as neat when tracking the time variation.
4.3 Methodological issues and results
Next I perform a set of linear regressions to explain the size of the informal sector using
information at the city and state levels. At the city level, the estimations are controlled for
price level inﬂation and for the fraction of employed working in the US. This last control
accounts for the scope of the labour mobility from Mexico to the US which has been
intensiﬁed as a result of the NAFTA and, of course, for geographical diﬀerences between
the border cities and the rest.
It is evident from Table 1 that the level of income inﬂuences informality. Hence, the
regressions include the state GDP per capita which may be thought of as the empirical
counterpart of Np, the number of shareholders in the theoretical model that is negatively
correlated with poverty. Nevertheless, for some states the GDP per capita is far from being
a good measure of income or development. This is the case of the states where a very large
but also very volatile share of GDP is generated from the exploitation of oil reserves by the
government-owned oil company (PEMEX)35. To address this issue I include explicitly this
34 This choice comes from the fact that some states nearly 50% of the population (i.e. the ﬁrst and
second quintile) is poor. Similar analysis with alternative measures of inequalities (Theil index and
other entrophy measures) and various measures of the size of the middle class (diﬀerent quintiles and
combinations of them) were performed (not reported) and the results barely diﬀer from the reported.
35 For instance, the states of Campeche and Tabasco.
18share in the regressions. Additionally the share of services (excluding ﬁnancial services) in
the state GDP is considered, as it is normally the less capital-intensive sector and the most
likely to host informal ﬁrms.
In virtue of the ﬁscal dependence of states explained in section 4.1, I include the ratio of
expenditure to own state revenues as an indicator of both the provision and maintenance
of public goods and services as well as direct transfers for social programs. Furthermore,
this variable interacts with the Gini coeﬃcient or the size of the middle class to test
whether income distribution aﬀects the eﬀects of ﬁscal resources availability on the size
of the informal sector.
I ﬁrst estimate the regression model with ﬁxed eﬀects OLS. Although this approach correctly
controls for unobservable ﬁxed factors or year eﬀects, it may render biased estimates as
the right-hand-side variables are probably endogenous. Hence, an instrumental variables
procedure is required, and I run ﬁxed eﬀects IV using the following instruments: the
age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age population); the fraction of indigenous
population; the number of homicides and people with pending judicial processes per 10,000
habitants; weather indicators; and the ﬁrst lag of the explanatory variables36.
Unfortunately, the available instruments are less than perfect and there are some chances
of having a weak instrument problem. Taking advantage of the dynamic nature of the data,
the third estimation approach is to add a full set of instruments consisting of suitable lags
of the levels of the explanatory and dependent variables for each cross-section involved in
the panel and then to perform a GMM estimation. This is the well-known dynamic panel
data estimator developed in Arellano and Bond (1991)37.
Table 2 presents the estimations results. To save space, only the GMM estimations in which
informality is measured according to the Size criterion are reported. For each estimation
method, two regressions were run. The ﬁrst (odd columns in the table) uses the Gini
coeﬃcient to summarise the income distribution, while the second (even columns) uses
the proxy for the size of the middle class.
It can be observed that a higher GDP per capita leads signiﬁcantly to a smaller informal
sector, whereas a higher share of services in the local GDP increases informality. In addition,
an increase in the expenditure to own revenues ratio, i.e. a larger transfer from the federal
to the state government, reduces informality. These results are robust to the measure of
informality or the estimation method used.
Consider the regressions with the Gini coeﬃcient as the explanatory variable. The coeﬃcient
associated with this index is positive, which implies that higher inequality tends to increase
the size of the informal sector, as predicted by the theory. Moreover, the coeﬃcient of the
36 The age dependency ratio is available at a city level from ENEU.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20interaction term is also positive, which implies that higher inequality reduces the eﬀect of
more ﬁscal resources on informality (which is negative). This ﬁnding is also supportive of
the predictions of the model. Nonetheless, these results are to be handled with care as they
are only signiﬁcant at a 10% level.
When considering the size of the middle class as a regressor, the evidence in favour of
the theoretical predictions is strengthened. A higher middle class implies a lower extent of
informality. This is true even after controlling for income levels (i.e. GDP per capita) so a
redistribution towards a larger middle class reduces the size of the informal sector. The high
inequality observed in the Mexican case is likely to be driving this ﬁnding. In terms of the
discussion in section 3.1, a larger middle class keeping poverty constant implies a reduction
in the upper class and a demand expansion in local markets, while the upper class after
redistribution is still large enough to cover the ﬁxed costs of local ﬁrms.
Additionally, in this case the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is negative, suggesting that
a more concentrated income distribution towards the middle class reinforces the negative
eﬀect of ﬁscal stimuli on informality. Consistent with the model, this result can be read
as an increase in the proﬁt multiplier (which pushes the F-curve up). These results are
signiﬁcant at least at a 5% level.
5 Summary and conclusions
Government regulation, taxation, and the institutional quality in a country have been
traditionally regarded as the main causes of informality. Yet some alternative approaches
have emerged to explain this widespread phenomenon by relying on the way market behaves
and its frictions. This study aims to contribute with this fresh view of the informal sector by
addressing the question of whether income inequality aﬀects informality and by focusing
exclusively on its eﬀect on market demand.
A simple model with features from Dasgupta and Ray (1986), Murphy et al. (1989) and
Matsuyama (2000) is developed. On the production side, ﬁrms decide simultaneously the
quantity of output to produce and the sector in which to operate. Each sector embodies
a diﬀerent technology. Formal ﬁrms produce under increasing returns to scale as they can
use a productive public services in exchange of a tax payment. Informal ﬁrms, on the other
hand, neither pay taxes nor access to the public services beneﬁts. It follows that it is easier
to comply with the prevailing regulations if the demand ﬁrms face for a given ﬁscal burden
(tax rate) is large enough. In other words, the larger the demand that a ﬁrm has to meet,
the higher the beneﬁts from formality. This fact establishes a link with the demand side on
the model which is entirely determined by the income distribution.
With this framework we were able to ﬁnd that high inequality leads to a large informal
21sector, and that redistribution towards the middle class decreases the size of the informal
sector while it increases the ability of ﬁscal instruments, either demand or supply-orientated,
to reduce informality. To support this, empirical evidence for Mexican cities is provided.
The analysis can be extended in various ways, but I want to emphasise one particular
extension. I have refrained from analysing any feedback from informality to income
distribution, which might be an important building block to improve our understanding
of the workings and eﬀects of the informal sector. This could be achieved by introducing
a market for shares or heterogeneity among workers and earnings in the formal and the
informal sector in the model. If, as in Rauch (1993), we accept that informal workers are
unskilled and have limited access to the stock market, then a causality from informality
to poverty and inequality would arise38. This channel may set the basis for moving to a
dynamic setup where income distribution aﬀects informality and vice versa. This seems to
be a promising direction for future research.
38 The eﬀect of informality on poverty and inequality is not a priori clear. One can argue that informality
prevents achieving optimal capital-labour mixes and thus is likely to increase poverty and inequality.
However, one can also postulate that when the informal sector is large, a person who is not employed
in the formal sector can easily enter the informal sector which may be a better situation than becoming
unemployed. Hence, informality may buﬀer the drop in that individual’s income and, upon aggregation,
mitigate poverty and inequality.
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24A Diﬀerential system
































































By deﬁnition, Θq ≡
R θq
θp θdR(θ) so
dΘq = θp dNp − θq dNq (A5)








































Formal sales are given by (7), hence






whereas employment in the formal sector is LF = (1 − ρ)SF,
dLF = (1 − ρ)dSF − SF dρ (A9)
Since the number of workers is ﬁxed, the change in labour demand in the informal sector (which
equals the change in sales in this sector) is
dLI = dSI = −dLF (A10)
25The diﬀerential version of the overall sales expression (8), where Θ ≡
R ∞
θp θdR(θ), is
dS = αdNp + Θdπ (A11)


















































































































Note that the above condition implies a small value for εg and, in fact, a steep M-curve. On the











(1 − ρΘq) (A16)
which holds if (A15) does.





















































so the M-curve is vertical and the F-curve still has negative slope.
26